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The market for private life annuities is characterised by adverse selection, that is, contracts 
offer lower than fair payoffs to individuals with low life expectancy. Moreover, life 
expectancy and income have been found to be positively correlated. The paper shows that a 
linear tax on annuity payoffs, which raises more revenues from long-living individuals than 
from short-living, represents an appropriate instrument for redistribution, in addition to an 
optimally designed labour income tax. Further, we find that a nonlinear tax on annuity payoffs 
can be directly employed to correct the distortion of the rate of return caused by asymmetric 
information. These results are contrasted with theoretical findings concerning the role of a tax 
on capital income. 
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I. Introduction 
As in many industrialised countries social security systems are under pressure 
because of an aging population, governments are trying to establish a so-called third 
pillar of old-age provision. The idea is that individuals should compensate a possible 
decline of the public pensions by increased private saving, that is, by shifting part of 
their income in the working period to the period of retirement. Among the various 
ways of how savings can be invested and how wealth, available for the financing of 
retirement consumption, can be accumulated, the purchase of private life annuities 
has the advantage of providing appropriate insurance against a long life. It allows the 
individual to avoid running out of assets before death as well as leaving unintended 
bequests. By transferring wealth from those, who die early, to those, who live long, 
annuities provide a higher rate of return than investments in the capital market (Yaari 
1965). 
 
There is a tendency among governments to grant some way of preferential taxation 
to individuals who purchase private life annuities.
1 The arguments for such a 
preferential treatment are rarely formulated explicitly; in the public discussion there 
seems to prevail a merit-good view, saying that individuals are myopic and therefore 
save too little in their active period of life.
2 In particular, they might not have a 
sufficient perception of the likely reduction of the replacement rate offered by the 
public pension.
3 In accordance with this view, several studies have investigated the 
incentive effect of taxes on the demand for private life annuities and on savings in 
general (for an overview see Bernheim 2002). 
 
Usually, economists have reservations against arguments based on irrationality of 
the individuals. If at all, these arguments might serve as a justification for public 
                                                 
1  For instance, in Austria the state subsidises the premium and, in addition, guarantees tax exemption 
of the payoffs. A similar regulation was introduced in Germany, the so-called Riester-Rente. In 
OECD countries the prevailing system seems to be that contributions to a pension fund are tax 
exempt, up to some limit, and pension payments are taxed, see, e.g., Whitehouse 1999 or OECD 
1994. 
2  For the UK, Disney et al. 2001a,b find some evidence, especially for low-wage earners, that the 
savings rate is too low in order to transfer sufficient income to the period of retirement. 
3  A similar argument rests on the suspicion that individuals might deliberately save too little, because 
they expect to receive some social assistance anyway.   2
programs of limited size only, which means in the case of private pensions that 
preferential taxation for merit-goods reasons should be restricted to a minimum 
provision to cover basic needs. In principle, taxation of private pensions should follow 
the same rules that are guiding the design of the tax system as a whole.  
 
This leads one to the question of what is the appropriate tax treatment of annuities 
with regard to efficiency and equity. In particular, the distributive effect of the way of 
how annuities are taxed deserves a more thorough analysis than has been provided 
by the theoretical literature so far.
4 To consider that together with the effect on 
economic efficiency in a coherent model is the subject of the present contribution.  
 
Obviously, besides providing insurance, the purchase of annuities represents an 
alternative to an investment on the capital market. It is therefore interesting to refer to 
results concerning the question of how such an investment should be taxed. On this, 
it seems fair to say that most theoretical studies have lead to the conclusion that 
capital income should be left tax-free, at least if some other instrument is applied for 
(redistributive) taxation in an optimal way and preferences are separable between 
leisure and consumption in different periods. Such a result can be derived in a static 
representative-consumer model of the Ramsey-type (see, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz 
1980), but also rather generally in dynamic models with many households, which 
differ in their ability to earn income or in their capital endowment.
5  
 
The important question is then whether this result changes, if the insurance aspect of 
private pensions is taken into account. To answer this, one has to consider the 
functioning of the annuity market, in particular the problem of asymmetric information: 
insurance companies cannot distinguish between individuals with low and high life 
expectancy. This fact, together with the assumption of price competition among 
insurance companies,
6 implies that firms are forced to offer the same rate of return to 
                                                 
4  Some studies concentrate on simulation results concerning to distributional effects of different tax-
treatments of annuities, see, e.g., Brown et al. (1999) and Burman et al. (2004). 
5  See Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) for infinite-horizon models, and Ordover and Phelps (1979) 
for OLG-models. On the other hand, in both frameworks there are a few studies which establish the 
desirability of a tax on capital income, e.g. if credit constraints (Chamley 2001, Aiyagari 1995) or 
human capital accumulation (Jacobs and Bovenberg 2005) are incorporated.  
6    Price competition follows from the assumption that insurance firms cannot monitor whether 
costumers hold annuities also from other firms. In contrast, price and quantity competition, which   3
all customers, irrespective of their expected duration of life. This in turn induces an 
adverse-selection effect, which was estimated to make private pension more costly, 
to the extent of 7 - 15 percent.
7 
 
What we focus on in the present study are the distributive consequences of this 
phenomenon and whether it provides a specific rationale for taxation. As a first step 
of the analysis, we compare, by means of a simple example, the effects of two forms 
of tax exemption, namely either a wage tax, which leaves annuity payoffs tax-free, or 
a consumption tax, which leaves saving untaxed but taxes dissaving (i.e., annuity 
payoffs) fully. In particular, we show that, though both forms are equivalent as to 
consumption and welfare of the individuals, the latter extracts less revenue from the 
short-living individual than the former.  
 
Next, we turn to a model with fixed labour income and endogenous annuity demand 
and demonstrate that the introduction of a proportional tax on annuity payoffs indeed 
redistributes income, which is due to the larger annuity demand of the longer-lived 
individuals. Hence, given that society wants to treat individuals with high mortality 
better, it can do so and use this instrument to compensate them for their 
disadvantage. We offer some ideas on the normative issue, which relative weights 
should be given to short- and long-living individuals in the social objective.  
 
For a more accurate analysis we have to allow for incentive effects on labour supply, 
where we take into account the empirical finding that income and life expectancy are 
positively correlated (see, among others, Attanasio and Hoynes 2000, Lillard and 
Panis 1998). We introduce this into the simplest possible model of optimum income 
taxation, consisting of two types of individuals, who live for two periods and differ in 
their wage rate and in their probability of survival to the second period. In this 
framework we consider two cases, that of a linear and of a nonlinear tax on annuity 
                                                                                                                                                          
was studied first by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977), requires that costumers can 
buy only one contract. Since this is regarded to be inapplicable for the annuity market, price 
competition is usually adopted for the analysis of the annuity market, see e.g. Pauly (1974), Abel 
(1986), Brugiavini (1993), Walliser (2000), Brunner and Pech (2005). 
7  Compared to a situation without adverse selection, i.e., where mortality of costumers is identical to 
that of the average population. See, e.g. Mitchell et al. (1999), Walliser (2000), Finkelstein and 
Poterba (2002).   4
income, resp. For a linear tax on annuity payoffs (in addition to the optimum 
nonlinear labour-income tax), we can prove that it increases social welfare, given that 
the weight of the low-wage (and low life expectancy) individual is sufficiently large in 
the social objective and that demand for annuities does not decrease too much with 
leisure. Hence, also in case of weak separability between leisure and consumption in 
both periods, taxation of annuity payoffs is optimal. This finding is in contrast to the 
results on capital income taxation mentioned above.  
 
Concerning the case of an optimum tax system, which is nonlinear not only with 
respect to wage income, but also with respect to annuity payouts, a remarkable, new 
feature turns out important: Such a fully nonlinear tax system has the advantage over 
the one with linear taxation of annuity payouts that it not only allows redistribution, 
but also a correction of the market failure arising from the adverse-selection problem. 
In particular, we find that the annuity payout of the long-living (and high-income) 
individual is reduced by the marginal tax rate to her individually fair payout. For the 
short-living individual the analogous effect increases her payout, however, a 
distortion may occur – familiar from optimum labour income taxation - and impede 
the (full) realisation of the first-best payout according to her low survival probability. 
This corrective role is characteristic for nonlinear annuity taxation, it differs markedly 
from the corresponding results for the optimum nonlinear tax on capital income. 
These typically show a zero marginal rate for the high-income individual and the 
same, but possibly distorted, for the low-income individual (see, e.g., Ordover and 
Phelps 1979, Brett 1998). 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides an intuitive example, illustrating 
that taxation of annuity payoffs indeed extracts more tax revenue from the long-living 
individuals, compared to an equivalent wage tax. Section III contains the detailed 
analysis, which first considers the effect of a tax on annuity payoffs vis-à-vis a 
proportional tax on fixed labour income. In the second part of this section a Mirrlees-
type model is formulated in order to study the optimum properties of a linear as well 
as of a nonlinear tax on annuity payoffs. Section IV provides concluding remarks. 
   5
II. Equivalent taxation 
As is well-known from straightforward textbook analysis (see, e.g., Stiglitz 2000), a 
proportional tax on wages (leaving capital income untaxed) is equivalent to a 
proportional consumption tax (leaving saving untaxed but burdening dissaving). We 
study some simple examples in order to derive an intuition of how this equivalence 
extends to the case of annuities.  
 
Consider a group of N identical individual who live for two periods. Each individual 
survives to the second period with probability π = ½. Let wage income in period 1 be 
w = 300. Suppose that after paying a wage tax with rate t = 0.2 each individual 
spends one third of net income w
n = 240 on annuities, that is, a = 80. We assume, for 
simplicity and in order to concentrate on the insurance aspect of annuities, that the 
interest rate is zero. Given the fair payoff rate q = 1/π = 2 per unit of annuity, the 
individual receives 160 in period 2. Altogether we have 
 
w = 300, w
n = 240, a = 80, c
0 = 160, c
1 = 160,    (1) 
 
and total tax revenue is 60N. 
 
On the other hand, if expenses for annuities are deductible, but payoffs are fully 
taxed with rate t = 0.2, the individual is exactly in the same situation as before, if she 
chooses a higher annuity demand of a = 100; then we have: 
 
w = 300, w
n = 260, a = 100, c
0 = 160, c
1 = 160.   (2) 
 
Note that the government receives 40 as a wage tax from every individual and 
another 40 from the tax on annuity payouts, but only from the surviving individuals. 
Therefore, total tax revenue is 40N + 40 2
N  = 60N, as before.  
 
Next assume that there are two groups L,H of individuals, where each group is of 
equal size N and characterised by a differing survival probability: πL =  1
3 , πH =  2
3 , 
otherwise they are identical. Insurance firms cannot distinguish between the groups, 
hence there exist only - so-called - pooling contracts with the same payoff rate for   6
each individual. We assume for the moment that both groups buy the same amount 
of annuities, then the payoff rate, which allows zero profits, is q = 1/((πL + πH)/2) = 2.  
 
In case of a wage tax with rate t = 0.2 the situation for each group is as described in 
(1) above, and (2) continues to reflect the effect of a consumption tax. However, 
there is one interesting aspect to observe: tax revenues TL from group L are 60N with 
the income tax, but only 40N + 40N/3 < 60N with the consumption tax. Still, 
consumption is the same with both kinds of taxes. This leads us to the question: Why 
is paying less taxes not to the advantage of group L? The answer is that with the 
consumption tax this group has to invest more into annuities, compared to the 
situation with the income tax (namely 100 instead of 80), which provide a lower than 
fair rate to them. If the tax payment of 60N were unchanged, this increased annuity 
demand ∆a = 20, given q < 1/πL, would reduce the short-living group’s lifetime income 
by the amount of ∆a(1 - qπL)N = 20(1 -  2
3 )N. From these considerations, it is obvious 
that the smaller tax payment ∆TL = 20N/3 just compensates the short-living group for 
the disadvantage arising from the increased demand, given the lower than fair rate of 
return. Moreover, one could say that, via this increased annuity purchase, group L 
implicitly finances the additional tax amount, which in fact the group with the higher 
life expectancy (for which the situation is vice versa, as q > 1/πH) has to pay in case 
of consumption taxation. Altogether, both groups are as well off in either tax regime.  
 
We can generalise this example by assuming that the share αi of group i  =  L,H, 
αL + αH = 1, and the first-period income wi need not be the same for each group i. In 
an annuity market, which is characterised by asymmetric information, a single rate of 
return, offered to both types of individuals, prevails in equilibrium. Under the 
assumption of perfect competition, this pooling rate of return is implicitly defined by 
the zero-profit condition that aggregate expected payoffs must equal the aggregate 
spending (the interest rate is still assumed to be zero), i.e. 
 
LLL HH H LL H H q( a a ) ( a a ) πα + πα =α + α . (3) 
 
Moreover, we can determine the lifetime budget constraint of an individual i, in case 
of an income tax, by combining 
0
ii i cw ( 1 t ) a = −− and 
1
ii cq a =  and, in case of a    7
consumption tax, by combining 
0
ii i c( 1 t ) ( w a ) =− −  and 
1
ii cq ( 1 t ) a =−. In either tax 







cw ( 1 t )
q
+= − . 
 
From this it is obvious that an individual i chooses the same consumption path over 
her lifetime in either tax regime (for any arbitrary utility function 
01
iii u(c ,c ; ) π ), if the 
rate of return is the same. In that case, 
in co
ii aa ( 1 t ) = − , where the superscripts “in” 
and “co” indicate the respective tax regime. 
 
As a result, total tax revenues from group i are 
in
ii i Tw t =α  with an income tax and 
are  ()
co co




i T  
depending on πi ≶ 1/q. Thus, as above, group L pays less with a consumption tax 
than with an income tax in case of a pooling payout rate, while the opposite is true for 
group H. However, as with the former tax group L has to buy more insurance, which 
offers unfavourable conditions, it is equally well-off, though it pays less taxes, and 
vice versa for group H.
8  
 
Finally, we observe that total revenue 
co co
LH TT +  of both groups from the consumption 
tax equals total tax revenue 
in in
LH L LH H TTt ( w w ) += α + α  from the income tax, if q is 
the pooling payoff rate determined by (3). Obviously, if q is below that rate, then a 
consumption tax raises less revenue than an income tax: the taxable base is reduced 
because of administrative costs and profits of the insurance companies, which are 
not accounted for in the present model. 
 
III. Taxation of annuity payoffs 
From the example in Section II we learn that taxing payoffs from annuity contracts 
not only changes the time path of tax payments, but also the tax burden falling on a 
                                                 
8  As above we find that the change in tax revenues 
co in
ii TT −  of each group i equals exactly the 
change of lifetime income 
co in
ii i i (a a )(q 1) α− π −  for the respective group, which would occur due to 
their increased annuity demand 
co in co
ii i aat a −=  (use the above result that 
in co
ii aa ( 1 t ) =− ) for 
unchanged 
in
i T .   8
particular group, given that survival probabilities differ across groups and that there is 
a pooling rate of return. However, in this example, the two tax systems still were 
equivalent, leaving welfare of both groups unaltered, due to a compensating effect 
from increased annuity purchases.  
 
In the present section we ask whether the fact that taxation of annuity payoffs 
reduces the revenue raised from the low life-expectancy group, compared to an 
income tax, can be used for redistributive purposes. The intuition is that in a tax 
system where a tax on annuity payoffs is employed, in addition to a tax on labour 
income (whose rate can then be reduced), some burden might be shifted from the 
short-living group to the long-living group through a related mechanism as described 
above. We consider two different kinds of models: the first assumes a fixed first-
period income, as in Section II, and is designed to answer the question of whether a 
distorting tax on annuity payoffs is desirable in addition to a proportional tax on 
labour income. The other model allows for incentive effects on labour supply in order 
to deal with the role of a tax on annuities, given the optimum nonlinear income tax in 
the tradition of Mirrlees.  
 
III.1 A tax on annuity payoffs in addition to a proportional income tax 
As in Section II we consider an economy that consists of two groups of individuals 
L,H with shares αL, αH (αL + αH = 1), who live for at most two periods and differ in the 
probability to survive to the second period, with πL < πH. In order to concentrate on 
the implications of different longevity risks, the fixed first-period income w is assumed 




i  i = 




i π  which is strictly 




i  and depends positively on the survival probability, i.e. 
i u0 ∂∂ π >. Note that in case of expected utility, which is typically assumed for the 
study of old-age provision under longevity risk (see e.g., Abel 1986, Brugiavini 1993, 
Walliser 2000), 
01




iii i i i u(c ,c ; ) u(c ) u(c ) π= + π  , (4) 
   9
where u   is (strictly concave) per-period utility derived from consumption. Let 
furthermore t denote a proportional tax on labour income, which is lump-sum (as 
income is fixed) and τ be the tax rate on annuity payouts. Indirect utility  ii v( , t ,) πτ  of 
an individual i is given as the solution of the optimisation problem 
{ }
01 0 1 01
iii i i ii max u(c ,c ; ) c c (q(1 )) w(1 t),c ,c 0 π+ − τ ≤ − ≥ . The budget constraint results 
from the two separate conditions:  0
ii ca w ( 1 t ) + ≤− ,  i
1
i a ) 1 ( q c τ − ≤ . As in Section II, 
we assume for the sake of simplicity that the interest rate is zero and that individuals 
have no other savings instrument.  
 




S(t, ) v ( ,t, )
=
τ≡ ρ α π τ ∑  (5) 
 
depending on the tax rates t,τ ≥ 0 that generate the required tax revenue G,  
 
LL L HH H G t w ( q a () q a () ) =+ τ π α ⋅ + π α ⋅ , (6) 
 
where ai(⋅) denotes the demand function for annuities for i = L,H. Inserting 
)) 1 ( q /( c a
1




LLL HH H Gt w ( c ( ) c ( ) ) =+ σ π α ⋅ + π α ⋅ ,   (6') 
 
with  ) 1 /( τ − τ ≡ σ .  
 
Let throughout Section III q be the pooling rate of return in equilibrium, implicitly 
determined by (3), for some given τ. Note that annuity demands aL, aH depend on q 
(and on τ), therefore q cannot be computed explicitly from (3).  
 
We start with τ = 0 and ask whether the introduction of a positive tax rate τ on annuity 
payoffs and a corresponding decrease in the income tax rate t, such that (6’) remains 
fulfilled, increases social welfare. In the following we only consider the first-round 
effect, that is, we take q as constant. The modification, if the effect of an increase of τ 
on the rate of return (via changes in annuity demand) is taken into account, will be 










∂τ ∂τ ∂ ∂τ ∑    (7) 
 





LLL HH H LL HH
cc
(c c ) ( ) t
w
∂∂ ∂σ




Using the abbreviation  )) 1 ( q /( 1 Q τ − ≡  and Roy's Lemma, (7) can be transformed to 
(
n w  denotes net income and 
n










=ρ α − λ − λ
∂τ ∂τ ∂τ ∑ . (7’) 
 
Inserting (8) into (7'), we derive for  τ ∂ ∂ / S  at τ = 0 (which also means σ = 0 and 




iii LLL HH H





=ρ α λ − + π α+ π α
∂τ ∑ .   (9) 
 
Substituting the pooling rate of return, determined by (3), together with 
1
ii 0 ac q
τ= =  
into (9) yields  
 






=α α ρ λ −ρ λ −
∂τ
,   (10) 
 
which allows us to formulate conditions under which the introduction of a distorting 
tax on annuity payoffs is desirable. 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose that annuity demand increases with the survival probability. 
Then the introduction of a tax τ on annuity payoffs and a corresponding decrease in 
the income tax rate t, such that (6) remains fulfilled, improves social welfare, if the   11
social marginal valuation of net income for individual L is larger than that for 
individual H, i.e. if  LL HH ρλ > ρλ . 
 
Proof: Immediate from (10) and the assumption that  ii a0 ∂ ∂π > .   QED. 
 
First note that a larger annuity demand of individuals with high life expectancy is 
indeed a reasonable assumption. It holds, for instance, if preferences are of the 
expected-utility type (4).
9 Moreover, from many empirical studies it is well known that 
adverse selection in the private annuity market in fact occurs, i.e. longer-lived 
individuals do purchase a larger amount of annuities.
10  
 
An intuition for Proposition 1 can be found by observing from (8) that 
LLL HH H q( a a ) w −∆τ π α +π α  represents the reduction of t in case of a marginal 
increase ∆τ (at τ = 0) to keep tax revenues constant. On the other hand, from the 
total differential of the indirect utility function vi one finds that utility of an individual i 
remains constant or increases, if t is reduced at least by  i aw −∆τ .
11 It follows, using 
equation (3) - which defines the pooling rate of return - that the short-living individuals 
are made better off through such a change, as clearly  LL HH L (a a ) a − α+ α < − , while 
the long-living individuals are made worse off. The relative weights in the social 
objective determine whether this is desirable. However, if q were sufficiently small 
(below the pooling rate of return), then not even the short-living individuals would 
benefit, because  LLL HH H q( a a ) −π α + π α  may eventually be larger than −aL. With any 
distorting tax the deadweight loss grows at second order with the tax rate, hence 
there is a upper bound to the tax rate on annuity payouts, above which an additional 
increase makes both types of individuals worse off.  
 
Taking into account the effect of τ on the pooling rate of return means that an 
additional term occurs in  Q/ ∂∂ τ  at τ = 0, viz. 
2 Q/ 1/q q'/q ∂∂ τ = −  (where q' q/ ≡∂ ∂ τ 
                                                 
9   Follows from implicit differentiation of the first-order condition 
n
ii i u(w a) q u(q a) 0 ′′ − −+ π =  . 
10  Mortality tables for voluntary annuitants in the well-developed U.S. and U.K. markets suggest that 
life expectancy for a typical 65-year-old male annuitant is about 20 percent longer than for a typical 
65-year-old male (see, e.g., Finkelstein and Poterba 2002, Mitchell et. al. 1999). 
11  Using the envelope theorem we get 
01
ii i i D v t w uc q auc 0 = −∆ ∂ ∂ −∆τ ∂ ∂ = . From this and the first-
order condition for annuity demand 
01
ii uc q uc 0 −∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ = , ∆t can be computed.    12
can in principle be determined by implicit differentiation of (3)). As a consequence, 
the term  LLLL HH H H (a a ) q ' / q ραλ +ραλ  has to be added in formula (10). In general, the 
sign of q' is undetermined.
12 Obviously, Proposition 1 remains true as long as q' is 
not too negative, i. e., as long as the composition of annuity demand does not 
change too much in favour of the high-risk group, if τ is introduced.  
 
Further note that the finding of Proposition 1 is not restricted to an annuity market 
which is characterised by asymmetric information, such that (3) determines the 
pooling payout rate in equilibrium. Even in a first-best world with perfect information, 
in which the individually fair rates of return  ii q1 = π , i = L,H, can be realised as an 
equilibrium, the introduction of a tax on annuity payouts implies redistribution from 
the high-demand individuals to the low-demand individuals, due to the same 
arguments as above. This is straightforward to show by using  ii q1 =π  instead of q, 
and 
1
ii i 0 ac q
τ= =  in (9), which yields 
 
() ( ) LH LL HH H H L L
0
S
a( q) a( q)
τ=
∂




Moreover, we find that under the assumption of expected utility (4) 
HH LL a( q) a( q) 0 −>
13, which implies that, as above, it is the group with low life 
expectancy that benefits from the introduction of τ at the expense of the group with 
the high life expectancy. 
 
In either case, it is the relative social evaluation  LL HH () ρ λρ λ  of the risk-groups, 
which is decisive, whether a positive annuity tax with the corresponding income-tax 
decrease should be implemented. Obviously, establishing the magnitude of 
LL HH /( ) ρλ ρλ  brings us to a difficult normative question; to tackle the issue, note first 
that with expected utility (4) the marginal utility of net income of the long-living 
individuals is higher than that of the short-living individuals, i.e.  HL λ >λ : Given equal 
                                                 
12  If the per-period utility function u ~ in expected utility (4) exhibits constant relative risk aversion, Pech 
(2004) has shown that a tax on payoffs aggravates adverse selection for certain parameter values, 
otherwise the effect is undetermined.  
13  To proof this result, substitute the individually fair rate into the first-order condition in footnote 9 to 
obtain  ii i
n u(w a ) u( a ) 0 ′′ −− +π =   and differentiate this term implicitly.     13
net income, individuals with a higher life expectancy value an additional unit of 
money more. Consequently, assuming an unweighted utilitarian social welfare 
function ( HL ρ= ρ ), the introduction of an annuity tax (with a corresponding decrease 
in the income tax) is not desirable. Instead a subsidy on the annuity payoffs (with a 
corresponding increase in the income tax) could serve as a possible instrument to 
increase social welfare.  
 
On the other hand, it is a common criticism on (unweighted) utilitarianism, that it 
implies distribution to be driven by individual marginal utilities, which may have 
nothing to do with an ethical objective. Such a position is taken, e. g. by Sen (1973, 
p. 16f). He illustrates this criticism by considering a handicapped individual, who 
derives less utility from additional income, compared to a healthy person, while for 
ethical reasons we might prefer to favour the handicapped person. Transferring 
Sen’s view to the present case, society may want to treat those individuals with poor 
health and high mortality
14 better, which means that this group is given a higher 
weight  LH ρ> ρ in the utilitarian welfare function (5). If  L ρ  is sufficiently large, it may 
imply redistribution, via the implementation of a proportional tax on annuity payouts.  
 
Finally, consider the even stronger egalitarian concept of Rawls, which aims at 
maximising the utility of the worst-off group. It can be shown that in case of a pooling 
rate of return indeed the group with low expectancy is worse off than the one with 
high life expectancy.
15 In the present model, we would then have  H 0 λ=  and it 
follows that according to the maximin criterion a positive tax rate on annuity payouts 
increases social welfare. However, note that with individually fair payouts the 
comparison of both groups’ utility levels is not clear-cut: On the one hand, the 
individual with the low life expectancy is worse off with any given consumption bundle 
                                                 
14  Obviously, what one has in mind here is that higher mortality occurs largely for biological or genetic 
reasons respectively and not rather out of personal choice (such as smoking or other risky 
behaviour).  
15  Immediate from the following considerations: With an equal rate of return, the budget set is the 
same for both types of individuals. Due to their higher life expectancy, individual H attain a higher 
utility level at type’s L optimal consumption bundle  LL
01 (c ,c ) than individual L (remember that 
i u0 ∂∂ π >). Consequently, individual H’s utility is obviously higher with her optimal choice 
01
HH (c ,c ).   14
than the long-living individual; on the other hand, as  LH qq > , the budget set of the 
short-living individual is larger. 
 
Altogether, we found in the present model that the social desirability of a tax on 
annuity payoffs leads one to the difficult normative issue, whether life expectancy 
itself can be an argument for a differentiated treatment of individuals. However, one 
should recognise that in any discussion of social equity and justice, illness and 
mortality cannot be ignored. Moreover, it should be clear that value judgments of this 
sort are involved in any political decisions, particular in the design of the tax system. 
 
III.2 A tax on annuity payoffs in addition to an optimum nonlinear income tax 
A more realistic model of the problem of tax design has to take into account the 
incentive effects on labour supply. Therefore, in the present subsection, the 
assumption of a fixed wage income is dismissed. Instead we consider an economy 
with two types of individuals, who differ in their wage rate bi, i = L,H, with bL < bH, 
and, as before, in their probability of survival to the second period. We again assume 
πL < πH and, thus, a positive correlation between the wage rate and life expectancy, 
which is plausible from empirical studies, as mentioned in the Introduction. 
Preferences are now described by the utility function 
01
ii i i u(l ,c ,c ; ) π , where li denotes 
labour supply. 
 
As is usual in optimum-taxation theory in the tradition of Mirrlees, we assume that the 
authority does not know individual abilities, but only gross income. Thus, the tax 
system consists of a (nonlinear) tax on gross income and, in addition, of a tax on 
annuity payoffs. Concerning the latter, we consider two different models: In the first 
one, we ask whether the introduction of a linear tax improves welfare, while in the 
second we analyse an optimum tax system which is fully nonlinear with respect to 
income from both labour and annuities.  
 
III.2.1 Linear taxation of annuities 
This case could be seen as a dual income tax system, where annuity payoffs are 
taxed separately from labour income, with a uniform rate τ. Let zi ≡ bili denote gross   15
income and xi net income. We define the indirect utility function, depending on zi and 
xi, vi(xi,zi,τ) ≡  { }
01 0 1 01
ii iiii i i ii max u(z b ,c ,c ; )c c (q(1 )) x ,c ,c 0 π +− τ ≤ > , for any tax rate 
τ on annuity payoffs. As is usual in models of optimum nonlinear income taxation, we 
have to assume that preferences fulfill the single-crossing condition 
 
 AM:  ) x / v /( ) z / v ( ) x / v /( ) z / v ( H H H H L L L L ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − > ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − , 
 
for any x, z, and τ.
16 Otherwise, redistribution via the tax on labour income could go 
from the less to the more able individual, because the latter would choose to work so 
little that her gross income is below that of the former.  
 
As already mentioned, the basic element of this Mirrlees-type model is asymmetric 
information concerning individual abilities, i.e., wage rates. In the model, this is 
accounted for through the so-called "self-selection constraints": the government 
assigns two gross and net income positions to the individuals in such a way that each 
does not prefer the position assigned to the other. 
 
Assuming again a weighted utilitarian social objective, the problem of the optimum 
nonlinear income tax reads, for any given tax τ on annuity payoffs: 
 
 max    LL L L HH H H v( x, z,) v( x, z,) , ρτ + ρ τ  (12) 
 s.  t. 
11
LHLH L L H H xxzz ( c ( ) c ( ) ) G , +≤++ σ π⋅ + π ⋅ − (13) 
  HHH HLL v( x, z,) v( x, z,) , τ ≥τ  (14) 
   H , L i , 0 z , x i i = ≥ . (15) 
 
(14) represents the self-selection constraint for the long-living and high-wage 
individual. In principle, an analogous restriction has to be formulated for the short-
living individual. However, one can show that with appropriate weights on the latter in 
the objective function (compare the discussion in III.1), the self-selection constraint 
for the short-living individuals is not binding in the optimum, while (14) is. Equation 
                                                 
16  The condition was called "agent monotonicity" by Seade 1982. It is a "single crossing condition", 
because it implies that indifference curves of the two individuals in (z,x)-space cross only once. 
See also Brunner 1989.    16
(13) is the resource constraint. For simplicity, we have neglected - possibly differing - 
group shares αL, αH in (12) - (13). Introducing them would not change the results. 
 
The first-order conditions for an optimum solution of (12) - (15) with respect to xi,zi, i = 
L,H are given in Appendix A. As in Subsection III.1, we denote by S(τ) the optimum 
value of the objective function (12), for given τ, and derive, by some manipulations 














where  υ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (14), and  H a[ L ]  denotes 
annuity demand, which the high-wage individual would choose in case of mimicking, 
i. e. if opting for gross and net income assigned to the low-wage individual. (16) 
follows from (A.9) in Appendix A, if the zero-profit condition (3) is used to show that 
the term in square brackets vanishes. With (16) we can formulate our main result, 
which refers to the first-round effect (holding q fixed), as before:  
 
Proposition 2: Assume that demand for annuities increases with the survival 
probability and does not increase with labour time. Then a linear tax on annuity 
payoffs, in addition to the optimum nonlinear income tax, improves social welfare. 
 
Proof:  H a[ L ]  >   L a  follows from the assumptions that (i) demand for annuities 
increases with the survival probability, which is higher for individual H and that (ii) 
demand is not positively associated with labour time, because, in case of mimicking, 
individual H works less than individual L. υ > 0 and  0 x / v L H > ∂ ∂  complete the proof. 
  QED. 
 
Having in mind Proposition 1, it may appear surprising that the weights of the 
individuals do not play a role in the above proposition. The explanation for this fact is 
that, when formulating the model (12) - (15) we have already assumed that with the 
optimum solution the self-selection constraint for individual H is binding. That is, the 
government would like to redistribute more income, but is restricted because of   17
asymmetric information. This assumption, which corresponds to the usual way the 
problem is formulated, in turn hinges on a sufficient importance of the disadvantaged 
individual L in the objective function. Proposition 2 shows that in such a situation, 
given a positive correlation between the wage rate and life expectancy, a tax on 
annuity payoffs allows additional redistribution, as it makes mimicking less attractive 
for the more able individual. 
 
Further, remember from Section III.1 that for expected utility the first assumption 
required for Proposition 2, namely that annuity demand increases with life 
expectancy is indeed fulfilled. Moreover, the second assumption - a non-positive 
association of annuity demand with labour time - is clearly guaranteed, if preferences 
are weakly separable between labour (leisure) and consumption in both periods, i.e. 
if annuity demand is independent of labour time, for given net income. 
 
It is interesting to compare the above result with a corresponding one concerning the 
role of a tax on capital income. As is well-known, given that preferences are weakly 
separable between labour (leisure) and consumption in different periods, no tax on 
capital income in addition to the optimum nonlinear income tax is desirable (see, e.g. 
Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, Ordover and Phelps 1979). A tax on capital income is 
only desirable, if saving is positively associated with leisure (compare also Corlett 
and Hague 1953). In the present model, however, the desirability of the tax on 
annuity payoffs in fact results, as long as saving (that is, annuity demand) does not 
decrease too much with leisure, so that this effect is outweighed by the increase in 
annuity demand of individual H due to her higher life expectancy.  
 
Note also that exactly the same formula (16) would arise in a first-best world, with 
individual fair rates of return qL, qH used instead of q in (A.8) and (A.9). We have 
argued in Section III.1 that in the expected-utility case aH(qH) > aL(qL) holds, thus a 
result similar to Proposition 2 applies. Finally it should be mentioned that taking into 
account the (second-round) effect of τ on the (pooling) equilibrium rate of return q 
means that an additional term depending on  q/ ∂ ∂τ occurs in (16), analogous to the 
situation in Section III.1.  
   18
III.2.2 Nonlinear taxation of income from labour and annuities 
A fully nonlinear system is based on the idea that in fact, by choosing the appropriate 
bundle of gross income and net income, an individual reveals her type (see, e. g., 
Brett 1998, Pirttila and Tuomala 2001 in the context of capital income taxation). This 
means that in the second period the tax on income from annuities can be imposed 
separately on each type. Consequently, we consider a tax system, which consists of 
a (nonlinear) tax T(z), imposed on gross income, and two (nonlinear) taxes TL(qaL), 
TH(qaH), depending on annuity payoffs. Technically, this means that the self-selection 








ii i ii ii v ( c, c, z ) u ( z / b , c, c, ) ≡π  . That is, the government has to select two 
complete bundles of labour time (or gross income, equivalently) and consumption in 
both periods, such that the more able person does not prefer the bundle assigned to 
the less able. (Again we assume a-priori that the government wants to redistribute 
income from the former to the latter type.) As before, a single-crossing condition is 
required, which has the same form as AM, but with vi(x,z,Ti) ≡ 
{ }
01 0 11 01
ii ii i i i i max u(z b ,c ,c ; ) c N (c ) q x, c ,c 0
− π+ ≤ > , where 
1
i N
−  is the inverse of the 
net income function
 
ii iii N( q a) q a T( q a) ≡− . AM has to hold for appropriate Ti.  
 






LL L L L HH H H H
c, c, z
max v (c ,c ,z ) v (c ,c ,z ), ρ+ ρ   (18) 
  s. t.   
00 1 1
LHL LH HLH cc c czzG , ++ π+ π ≤+− (19) 
 
01 01
HHHH HLLL v( c, c, z) v( c, c, z) , ≥   (20) 
  
01
iii c, c, z 0 ≥ ,    i = L,H.   (21) 
 
The corresponding first-order conditions can be found in Appendix B. The solution 
has the following properties:  
   19
Proposition 3: For type H the optimum nonlinear tax on annuity payoffs exhibits a 
positive marginal tax rate equal to  H (q 1/ ) q − π . For type L, the sign of the marginal 
tax rate is undetermined.  
 




i i i i ii ii i i i i maxu(z /b,c ,c ; ),s.t.c z T(z ) a andc qa T(qa) π= − − = −  
 
one derives an expression for the marginal tax rate  i T′ in terms of the marginal rate 







u/ c v / c 11
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where the second equality is immediate from the definition of  i v  . On the other hand, 
















must hold, thus the first part of the Proposition is proved. For type-L individuals, (B.1) 




LL L H L
11
LL L H L L
v/c v/c 1
v/c v/c
ρ∂ ∂ −υ ∂ ∂
=







HL v/c ∂∂  , t = 0,1, describes the marginal utility of individual H in case of 
mimicking, i.e. opting for the type-L bundle. In general, it cannot be concluded from 
(23), whether  ∂∂ ∂∂ π
01
LL LL L (v/c) / (v/c) 1 /  ≶  and therefore the marginal tax rate on 
annuity payoffs is undetermined.   QED. 
 
One observes that the marginal tax rate for group L will be negative, if the marginal 
rate of substitution between present and future consumption of individual L does not 
differ much from that of individual H in case of mimicking, because then (23) implies 
that 
01
LL LL (v/c) / (v/c) ∂∂ ∂∂   is close to 1/πL, while the pooling rate of return q is smaller   20
than  πL 1/ . On the other hand, if individual H values future consumption more (in case 
of mimicking), because of her higher life expectancy, then we have 
01 01
LL LL HL HL (v/c) / (v/c) (v/c) / (v/c) ∂∂ ∂∂> ∂∂ ∂∂   , which together with (23) implies that 
01
LL LL L (v/c) / (v/c) 1 / ∂∂ ∂∂< π  .
17 This in turn, used in (22), tells us that the marginal tax 
rate on annuity payoffs, for individual may also be positive.  
 
It is important to notice the difference of the result in Proposition 3 to the previous 
one: while the desirability of a linear tax on annuities essentially depends on the 
difference in annuity demand of high- and low-risk individuals, a further motive arises 
with a nonlinear tax: the correction of the rate of return in a pooling situation. This is 
more in line with the intuition developed in Section II: the loss (benefit) from pooling 
of the short-living (long-living) individual, compared to individually fair payoff rates, 
gives rise to a differentiated treatment by the tax system. It is obvious from the proof 
of Proposition 3 that if q was equal to the individually fair rates qL, qH, resp., then the 
marginal tax rate for individual H is zero, while a distortion - familiar from other 
Mirrlees-type models - arises for individual L. The correction of this market failure 
arising from asymmetric information is specific for annuity taxation; in models 
investigating the optimum nonlinear capital income tax, the marginal tax rate for the 
high-wage individual is zero, while for the low-wage individual it is distorted, except 
when preferences are weakly separable between consumption and leisure (Ordover 
and Phelps 1979). 
 
In fact, in the present model the payoff rate fixed on the annuity market does not 
directly enter the planner's optimisation problem, which aims at determining optimum 
second-best bundles. The marginal tax rate follows from a comparison with the rate 
of return offered by the market. Such a correction of the rate of return through the tax 
system becomes possible, if we follow the idea that in the retirement period the 
authority can indeed identify individuals by their types, because these are revealed 
when gross (and net) income is reported by the end of the working period. Yet, 
annuity demand is expressed during this period already, when neither tax authority 
                                                 
17    This follows immediately by rewriting 
01 01
LL LL HL HL (v/c) / (v/c) (v /c) / (v /c) ∂∂ ∂∂> ∂∂ ∂∂    as 
11 00
HL LL HL LL (v /c)(v/c) (v /c)(v/c) ∂∂ ∂∂> ∂∂ ∂∂    and by transforming equation (23) to 
() ( )
00 0 11 1
LL H L LL H L L LL L LL L (v/c) (v/c) (v/c) (v/c) (v/c) (v/c) 1 ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ∂∂ ρ − υ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ρ −υ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = π ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦      .   21
nor insurance firms can distinguish the types, therefore the latter are unable to offer 
individually fair rates.  
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that in both models – with linear or nonlinear taxation 
of annuity payoffs – the usual properties concerning the optimum tax rates on labour 
income can be derived: It is zero for the more able individual but positive for the less 
able.  
 
IV. Concluding comment 
Private life annuities are becoming a more wide-spread instrument for old-age 
provision, as public pension systems are expected to provide less support in the 
future. However, it is well-known that the annuity market is affected by an adverse-
selection problem, which is a typical obstacle to many insurance markets. As a 
consequence, it provides only less than fair contracts for individuals with low life 
expectancy. In addition, empirical studies have found that life expectancy and income 
are positively correlated. Therefore, it appears a natural question to ask whether 
these facts should have an influence on the tax system, in particular on the balancing 
of efficiency and equity considerations. 
 
Theoretical studies on capital income taxation have shown that in a variety of models 
such a tax cannot fulfil any further redistributive task, given an optimally designed tax 
on labour income. Intuitively, one might be willing to accept a similar statement for 
the taxation of annuity payoffs. On the other hand, intuition also shows that such a 
tax falls on long-living individuals to a larger extent than on short-living and has, thus, 
a different effect compared to a tax on income from labour or capital.  
 
Under the provision that life expectancies and wages are positively correlated, we 
were able to find clear results in Section III.2 within the framework of optimum 
income taxation: A linear tax on annuity payoffs can be used for redistribution, if 
annuity demand increases with life expectancy, which is quite plausible. A nonlinear 
tax can be directly employed to correct the distortion of the rate of return caused by 
asymmetric information, irrespective of demand.    22
 
Obviously, the basic question underlying the above results is, whether society 
favours redistribution at all and, in particular, how it values the welfare of groups with 
differing life expectancy (and income). On this, we presented some ideas in Section 
III.1, but of course, economic analysis cannot provide a final answer. Its main task is 
to point out the distributive consequences associated with the construction of a tax 
system.   23
Appendix A 
The Lagrangian to the maximization problem (12) - (15) reads 
 
  ( )
()
11
LL L L HH H H L H L H LL HH
HHH HLL
Lv ( x , z , )v ( x , z , )x x z z( c c ) G
v( x, z,) v( x, z,),
=ρ τ +ρ τ −µ + − − −σπ +π + +
+υ τ − τ
 
 
which gives us the first-order conditions: 
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where [L] in the last term means that the derivative of vH is computed at (xL,zL,τ). By 
Roy's Lemma we have  ii i i v/ c(v/ x) (Q / ) ∂∂ τ = − ∂∂∂∂ τ , where  )). 1 ( q /( 1 Q τ − ≡  Using 
















ρ = µ    (A.6) 
 
















ρ = µ  (A.7) 
 
in turn in (A.5) we derive (note that, at τ = 0,  / 1 ∂σ∂ τ =, Q/ 1/q ∂ ∂τ = ) 
   24
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where ] L [ c
1
H  denotes consumption in the second period, which the high-wage 
individual would choose, if endowed with gross and net income of the low-wage 
individual.  
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We write the Lagrangian function for (18) - (21) as  
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